In April 2026, a study by the French government did something Brussels rarely allows: it counted. The High Commissioner for Strategy and Planning mapped the think tanks that shape European policy. Its analysis shows an ecosystem dominated by foreign tech giants, with a growing presence of Chinese capital. It also notes that transparency about these organisations’ funding remains very uneven — and calls for change.

This issue reaches far beyond think tanks. Across Europe, NGOs, human-rights foundations and advocacy groups have become intermediaries between private fortunes, foreign governments and European institutions. Many do useful work. But the rules governing their funding leave citizens in the dark at a moment when transparency is most needed.

Consider what the EU transparency register actually requires. A non-profit must name an individual donor only if that contribution exceeds both €10,000 and 10% of its annual budget. An NGO with a multi-million-euro budget can therefore lobby on sanctions or anti-money-laundering rules, fully comply with the register and never publicly reveal the identity of a single major sponsor. This is not a loophole. It is how the system was designed.

We already know where opacity can lead. The so-called Qatargate affair began with a former chair of the European Parliament’s human-rights subcommittee who, after leaving office, founded an NGO. That organisation developed an extensive political network while remaining outside the transparency register. In Germany, the state of Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania created in 2021 a “foundation for climate and environment” whose commercial arm supported companies working on the Nord Stream 2 project. About €192 million was paid by the pipeline operator, controlled by Gazprom. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a parliamentary inquiry tried to determine whether the foundation had effectively been a cover for a strategic Russian project — an inquiry that took place in a highly politicised context.

These cases are not equivalent and controversy does not automatically imply wrongdoing. The trickiest questions arise where legitimate advocacy, private financial interests and access to political power overlap. The Open Dialogue Foundation (ODF) illustrates this tension.

For more than a decade, this relatively small Polish–Belgian foundation has campaigned for opposition figures from the former Soviet space, for reform of INTERPOL and for changes to financial regulation. Its main beneficiary has been Mukhtar Ablyazov, the former head of Kazakh bank BTA. Kazakhstan accuses him of embezzling billions; he says the prosecutions against him are politically motivated, and France refused his extradition for that reason. British courts have nevertheless handed down multi-billion-dollar judgments against him, found breaches of disclosure and asset-freezing obligations, and sentenced him to 22 months for contempt of court.

The ODF’s finances have been scrutinised. In 2019, The Times reported allegations that over £1.5 million passed through Scottish shell companies before reaching accounts linked to the foundation. Those funds were said to be connected to lobbying for Ablyazov and Moldovan businessman Veaceslav Platon.

Platon is currently fighting extradition from the UK to Moldova, where prosecutors accuse him of offences linked to the “Russian Laundromat”, a mechanism through which more than $20 billion are alleged to have been moved out of Russia. He denies wrongdoing and claims the prosecutions are politically driven. The pattern echoes the Ablyazov case: on one side, serious allegations of financial crime; on the other, claims of political persecution. European courts and influence networks are the battleground where these narratives collide.

The ODF has strongly denied these allegations. In its entry in the EU transparency register the organisation records a €1.8 million budget for 2023, funded by donations and crowdfunding, without naming a major contributor.

A noble cause cannot replace the need to know who funds it.

Meanwhile, the ODF’s priorities have shifted from individual cases to shaping international rules. In July, ODF president Lyudmyla Kozlovska chaired a hearing in The Hague, organised with senior Italian parliamentarians, where she advocated stronger protection for donor anonymity and financial confidentiality — a stance that raises obvious questions about NGO-funding transparency. Four days later, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted the The Hague Declaration, including a resolution presented by Italian legislators on “transnational financial repression” and the instrumentalisation of INTERPOL, as well as measures on anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism financing.

When a resolution on financial transparency and on questioning anti–money-laundering rules is adopted after a hearing co-organised by a group whose main funders are not publicly identified, voters and representatives are entitled to ask who stands to benefit.

France has a particular reason to lead. Its own government highlighted how little French voices are heard in Brussels and how much debate is influenced by foreign funds. Paris should transpose the April 2026 report’s conclusions to the European level: stricter disclosure requirements for organisations that lobby on financial regulation and judicial cooperation, and the same obligation for anyone organising hearings in parliaments and international assemblies.

Europe needs independent NGOs and human-rights defenders. But a noble cause cannot replace the necessity of knowing who pays for it. The question is not only who lobbies Europe, but who finances that lobbying — and how much European citizens should be informed.

Philippe Karsenty is spokesperson for the Trump Committee France.