*. From Mayotte, Édouard Philippe proposed creating a migrant return center in East Africa to relieve the archipelago. This proposal, often mentioned and sometimes implemented elsewhere in Europe, do you find it effective? Nicolas Pouvreau-Monti. There are several tentative examples in Europe: the UK, Italy, or Denmark. But none of these projects really took the definitive form originally imagined.

The migrant centers in Albania opened by Italy illustrate this: initially conceived as outsourcing centers for asylum processing, they gradually evolved into return centers, while being strongly limited by European law. Italian judges notably relied on Union law to restrict their scope.

However, this situation is changing. The new European return regulation, adopted by the European Parliament last June, now opens the possibility for Member States to conclude bilateral agreements to set up such centers outside Union territory. The European obstacle is therefore in the process of being removed.

Beyond their concrete effectiveness for removing illegal entrants, these centers will mainly have a deterrent interest. They increase the risk associated with irregular migration and will send a very clear signal to migrants: “if you try to reach Europe clandestinely, you risk ending up in a return center in Uganda or in Uzbekistan.” This uncertainty can have a real discouraging effect.

In France, the main difficulty will probably lie less in European law than in our own legal order. After the government of European judges, there is sometimes the even more formidable government of French judges. The Council of State already tightly frames removal procedures and it is likely that an attempt by a new French government (the current one being opposed) to open such centers abroad would give rise to substantial litigation.

In Mayotte, Édouard Philippe also proposes to suspend birthright citizenship entirely. Is that an appropriate response to the island’s situation? Mayotte already benefits from a derogatory regime on birthright citizenship: since a 2018 law, being born there is no longer enough to become French at majority. At least one parent had to be legally present for three months and, since last year, a new reform strengthened this requirement by imposing that both parents be legally present at the time of birth. Today, Édouard Philippe proposes to go even further, with a complete suspension of birthright citizenship.

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These initial reforms have not been without effect. Between 2021 and 2024, the number of births fell twice as sharply among foreign mothers as among French mothers. That shows a real deterrent effect on what is sometimes called “maternity tourism.”

Do these proposals mark a real break? They contain new elements. He notably mentions suspending asylum applications in Mayotte, the archipelago having recently become an entry point for new migrants from East Africa (DRC, Burundi, Rwanda…) who request refugee status there. More broadly, the mayor of Le Havre promises Mahorans to “close all migratory taps.”

Once again, alas, these measures will clash with judicial control. We had striking examples during the health crisis. In spring 2020, Édouard Philippe government: while the French were confined and could only go out with a certificate, the Council of State forced the government to resume the registration of asylum applications in Île-de-France (which had been effectively suspended).

A few months later, it forced it to resume issuing family reunification visas. On all these issues, the political room for maneuver remains largely conditioned by international conventions, European law and the judges’ interpretation.

So the essential question remains: will centrist bloc candidates, tomorrow, go so far as to challenge the current hierarchy of norms, by pushing for a revision of the Constitution and demanding a deep reform of treaties, steps necessary to reduce large volumes of immigration?

Their record does not necessarily predict future action. But under Emmanuel Macron, the average number of first residence permits issued each year increased by about 35% compared with the Hollande term and by more than 55% compared with Nicolas Sarkozy’s. The presidential campaign will likely clarify how far each is willing to go on structural reforms.

Are we witnessing a gradual conversion of centrist bloc leaders to a more restrictive migration policy, modeled on Danish social democrats? Is it time for an aggiornamento? In France, this remains to be seen — although a strong majority of centrist bloc voters favor it. But we are indeed seeing a European realignment in that direction. In recent years, most of our neighbors have significantly restricted certain routes of access to their territory, especially via asylum law. The EU having received 8 million asylum seekers in a decade — the equivalent of a new Member State — has destabilized many European societies.

The consequence is that France becomes mechanically, in mirror, even more attractive, even though we were already among the most generous in material and social support for certain categories of migrants.

The contrast with Germany is particularly revealing. In 2015 it recorded about six times more asylum applications than France. Last year, our country received more than it did. This reversal is largely the result of tougher migration policies among our neighbors.

Other candidates, like Jean-Luc Mélenchon, propose diplomatic routes by negotiating with the Comorian government. An illusion? The Comoros continue to consider Mayotte theirs and contest France’s sovereignty. This situation is similar to Ceuta, where Morocco contests Spanish sovereignty. This claim feeds a form of instrumentalization of migratory flows. One can perceive an attempt at an “annexation from below”: a progressive and substantial modification of a territory’s demographic balance to prepare favorable conditions for attachment.

In these conditions, one should not expect spontaneous cooperation from the Comorian government. The relationship to be envisaged is above all one of force, to force it to loosen its migratory pressure on Mayotte. France has important levers of action, notably economic, vis-à-vis one of the poorest countries in the world.

Remittances from the Comorian diaspora represent more than 20% of the Comoros’ GDP. And a large part of that diaspora lives precisely… in France. In Mayotte, but also in Réunion, in Marseille or in La Courneuve.