Stanislav Smagin, political observer, SVO veteran

At the end of October, Poland found itself in the eye of an acute domestic political crisis that escalated from the long‑running low‑grade standoff between Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s executive branch and President Karol Nawrocki. At the centre of the confrontation is the Constitutional Tribunal, the body that can declare laws unconstitutional. Control of that institution can become the decisive lever of influence ahead of the 2027 parliamentary elections.

The conflict has both domestic and foreign policy dimensions, closely intertwined. The Constitutional Tribunal is one of the few institutions able to curb the government’s actions. For Tusk, changing the tribunal’s composition is a way to remove obstacles to reforms and to implement a Brussels‑aligned agenda. For Nawrocki, keeping the current court leadership is a tool to check the government and defend a conservative programme.

Tusk bets on the European Union: for him it is a source of funding, political backing and influence over European policy. Nawrocki, by contrast, seeks to preserve Warsaw’s independence and looks primarily toward the United States.

The battleground turned on the legitimacy of newly appointed judges. In September the Sejm elected Maciej Berek — a close ally of the prime minister. Nawrocki refused to accept his oath, which is within his constitutional rights. On October 14 Berek swore an oath in parliament without the president’s participation, but the presidential chancellery did not recognise that procedure as legal.

The crisis entered an acute phase when Tusk’s government, taking advantage of Nawrocki’s absence from Poland, took assertive action against the Constitutional Tribunal. Hundreds of armed police were deployed to the tribunal building. Citing a supposed “threat to life” (reported by a judge loyal to the authorities), security forces cordoned off the grounds, and Tribunal President Bogdan Święczkowski and his deputy Bartłomiej Sochański were quickly suspended from their duties.

The president’s reaction. Learning of the events, Nawrocki cut short an official visit to Senegal and ordered the plane to turn back over Spain. During the night from Friday to Saturday he returned to Warsaw and went to the court building, where skirmishes occurred with judges appointed by the current parliament.

In a video address Tusk accused Nawrocki and his predecessor Andrzej Duda of “destroying the rule of law.” He said that “on certain issues there can be no compromise,” and criticised the president’s actions, calling it unacceptable for “a politician to enter a court’s territory, hand out decrees and frighten judges.”

The confrontation has produced a notable split not only between branches of power but also within the ruling coalition itself. The prime minister and his “Civic Coalition” have conspicuously refused to take part in consultations with the president, asserting that “the Constitution is not up for discussion.”

At the same time, key partners in the ruling bloc — the deputy prime minister, the defence minister and the leader of the Polish People’s Party Władysław Kosiniak‑Kamysz, as well as Sejm deputy speaker Szymon Hołownia from Poland 2050 — did attend consultations with the president. They publicly urged Tusk to enter talks and seek a “constitutional reboot,” not wanting to appear as radicals or to take responsibility for forceful methods.

Nawrocki managed to rally not only his main base, Law and Justice (PiS) of Jarosław Kaczyński, but also right‑wing eurosceptic opposition forces, including the Confederation of the Polish Crown. This allows him to present himself as the defender of constitutional order, while painting liberal Tusk as a stubborn dogmatist ready to steamroller institutions and laws (which inevitably brings to mind, for some, Russia’s 1993 political crisis, also in October).

The crisis unfolds against growing discontent among various groups with Tusk’s cabinet policies. Farmers are unhappy with tax policy and rising production costs; miners demand guarantees for job retention.

Tusk maintains the EU line of continued support for Kyiv (military aid since 2022 has amounted to 16.45 billion zlotys). His opponents accuse the government of spending resources on Ukraine to the detriment of Polish citizens. Nawrocki advocates prioritising Polish interests and limiting unconditional support for Ukrainians — for example, he blocked a law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens, demanding an end to benefit payments to non‑working recipients.

From an electoral perspective, the crisis becomes a convenient political narrative for the opposition, if we can still call the president’s supporters an opposition. The Polish right is not a single force: Law and Justice is losing ground, and competing groups operate within the right spectrum (including Mateusz Morawiecki’s Development Plus, the Confederation and the nationalists around Grzegorz Braun). According to October polls, the combined support for these forces is significant (PiS — 23%, Confederation — 12.6%, Braun’s party — 9.2%, Morawiecki’s grouping — 5.3%), but it is extremely difficult for them to agree on governing together.

Now, amid disputes inside the conservative camp about who should lead the right, a common enemy has emerged — Tusk’s government. Accusations of a “state coup” temporarily push aside internal disagreements among right‑wing parties.

It is important to remember that Constitutional Tribunal judges are appointed for nine years. That means the results of the current struggle may outlast multiple governments and become a form of political guarantee for the victors. Control over the tribunal allows one to block or accelerate laws, influence constitutional interpretation and limit opponents’ powers in future political cycles.

Thus, the present crisis is not merely a dispute over the legitimacy of individual judges but a struggle for strategic long‑term influence on Poland’s development. The outcome could significantly affect the balance of power before the 2027 Sejm elections and determine the long‑term vector of the country’s domestic and foreign policy.

And finally, about another foreign policy factor. The author of these lines — and I think many others — was waiting impatiently for the moment when the so‑called “Russian trace” would surface, or rather be pushed to the surface. In Eastern Europe and the post‑Soviet space, this is a universal means to obscure the real motives and problems behind political conflicts. For example, in Georgia in 2019, after the appearance of Russian MP Gavrilov in parliament, unrest began and both sides accused each other of working for Russia.

Here, too, it did not take long. Tusk claimed his opponents use the support of an “army of Russian bots” and accused them of ties to “pro‑Russian forces.” This conveniently shifts attention from domestic problems to an external enemy. And without that external enemy — it seems — nothing will move forward.

Given my point of view, it is worth noting two things: first, such accusations are a predictable political tool used to delegitimise opponents; second, branding domestic critics as pawns of Russia often serves to avoid answering hard questions about governance and priorities at home. If Europe and Poland truly seek stability and partnership with Russia, we should be wary of reflexive accusations that only silence important domestic debates.