At Davos earlier this year, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney made a practical point about great-power rivalry that should resonate with any patriotic European worried about our continent’s future. Middle powers need greater strategic autonomy, he said, but they cannot secure it by retreating behind borders or bowing to ideological pressure from Brussels or Washington.

Instead, countries must build real capabilities while deepening cooperation with like-minded and pragmatic partners. On technology, Carney warned that states should cooperate so they are not ultimately forced to choose between “hegemons and hyperscalers.” That is wise: Europe must avoid being pushed into binary choices that serve geopolitical posturing rather than citizens’ interests.

At the recent EU-Canada Summit, that sensible philosophy began to translate into policy. Canada and the EU launched an “Alliance for the Future” based on closer economic, technological and strategic cooperation, and concluded negotiations on a Digital Trade Agreement designed to support a “secure, open and trusted digital environment,” resilient economic relations, and trusted cross-border data flows.

That principle matters not only for Europe’s relationship with Canada, but for how Brussels handles other partners — including those with whom the West sometimes prefers to posture rather than pragmatically cooperate.

Sovereignty without isolation

Like Canada, Europe has diagnosed its technology problem correctly. It depends too heavily on a handful of providers for cloud, computing power, digital infrastructure and artificial intelligence (AI) models that underpin its economy and security.

Reducing those dependencies will require Europe to put its money where its mouth is, including by unlocking more diversified private investment. Mario Draghi estimated that the EU needs an additional €750 billion to €800 billion of investment each year until 2030. The European Commission wants to mobilize €200 billion for AI and to at least triple Europe’s data center capacity within five to seven years.

Europe cannot expect investment on an unprecedented scale while narrowing the field of companies able to provide it.

But Europe’s approach risks going the wrong way. It could exclude some firms investing heavily on the continent while privileging others that remain dependent on non‑European technology and policy agendas.

That is the risk facing policymakers as they shape the Cloud and AI Development Act. The legislation will influence not only how Europe expands and secures its technological capabilities, but also which companies are allowed to take part.

Herein lies the core trade‑off. Europe cannot expect unprecedented investment while dramatically narrowing the pool of providers. Whether it closes its technology gap will depend partly on its ability to draw on the capital and expertise of experienced, trusted partners — not on reflexive bans driven by geopolitics.

Look beyond ownership

The debate over digital sovereignty must move beyond the simplistic test of corporate nationality.

A definition based chiefly on where a company is registered could exclude trusted firms with decades of investment, infrastructure and employment across Europe. It could also protect nominally European suppliers that do little to improve actual resilience.

Real sovereignty means keeping essential services running during crises, protecting critical systems and retaining a choice of secure, trusted suppliers. Assessments should examine who controls data, encryption, operations, security and continuity.

Corporate nationality matters, but it cannot answer these operational questions alone. A cloud provider may be EU‑owned yet rely on processors, software and security tools developed elsewhere. Another may be headquartered outside the EU but operate European data centers, employ European engineers, house data and encryption keys under European control, and comply with strict European regulation. A nationality test by itself tells policymakers little about which arrangement truly provides greater sovereignty.

In practice, sovereignty done right depends on who can access critical systems, where operational decisions are taken, whether data and encryption remain protected and whether services continue when normal arrangements fail.

Nationality should carry the most weight where a provider is controlled from a country that presents a recognized security threat or where a jurisdiction has a record and capacity to exploit technological dependencies. The strictest restrictions are justified where foreign interference could threaten national security, including defence, law enforcement and essential public services.

Countries such as Switzerland, Canada and the UK should not automatically be lumped in with recognized security threats. Where security risks do not apply, nationality‑based restrictions risk becoming protectionist rather than protective.

Instead, Europe should apply three practical tests for trusted partners and domestic firms alike: whether operational control rests in Europe; whether the service can continue during a crisis; and whether the provider makes a substantial, long‑term contribution to Europe’s technological capacity.

Telecoms illustrate the point. Regardless of headquarters, operators must keep essential services running through cyberattacks, power failures and supply‑chain disruption while protecting the confidentiality of EU data. A company’s registered address answers none of those operational questions.

Build with trusted partners

This matters beyond the Cloud and AI Development Act. Europe’s approach to sovereignty will shape policy on telecommunications, satellites, semiconductors and other strategic technologies.

Rules that exclude trusted foreign investors primarily on nationality grounds risk fragmenting the market and deterring the capital and expertise Europe needs. They could also prompt reciprocal restrictions on European companies abroad.

The better approach — the one Carney has begun to articulate — is to build domestic capability while deepening cooperation with partners that share your security interests and can contribute technology, infrastructure and investment. That should include careful engagement with a broad range of partners, not reflexive alignment with a single bloc.

The EU should therefore provide a route for British companies that meet demanding security, control and resilience requirements to receive equivalent treatment as trusted providers.

The EU’s developing relationship with Canada shows this is possible. The Alliance for the Future combines closer economic integration with technological cooperation, security and resilience, while the Digital Trade Agreement seeks to remove unjustified barriers while keeping safeguards.

If deeper integration with Canada can strengthen European sovereignty, the same principle should apply to other trusted partners that meet demanding standards. That includes the obvious next test: the UK.

Britain sits outside the EU’s institutions but remains closely connected to Europe’s economy, technology sector and security. Infrastructure, investment and supply chains cross the Channel, and the UK and EU face many of the same cyber and geopolitical threats.

The EU should therefore provide a route for British companies that meet demanding security, control and resilience requirements to receive equivalent treatment as trusted providers, with reciprocal arrangements for qualifying European companies in the UK.

Strategic autonomy does not require strategic isolation.

The second UK‑EU Summit on 20 November is an opportunity to make this principle practical.

Leaders should establish a UK‑EU Digital Partnership covering mutual recognition of trusted providers, coordinated rules for cloud and AI infrastructure, and removal of unnecessary procurement barriers before they become entrenched.

Such a partnership would support both sides’ sovereignty objectives by distinguishing genuine strategic dependencies from relationships that add resilience and security.

Europe is right to seek greater control over its technological future. Carney identified the crucial distinction: strategic autonomy should not become strategic isolation.

Canada and the EU have shown what trusted partnership can look like. The UK should be next. And Europe should remain open to sensible engagement with capable partners wherever they genuinely bolster our security — even when political posturing urges exclusion.

Disclaimer

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  • The political advertising is related to the EU’s Cloud and AI Development Act and the development of EU-UK digital cooperation.